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1 Introduction
The 2008 global financial crisis and—more recently—the European sovereign debt crisis have
spurred debates among academics and policymakers about the regulation of large, systemically
important banks. Most of the institutions under scrutiny are multinational banks, with operations
in multiple countries, raising concerns about contagion and shock transmission. Arguably, regula-
tory reforms should be not only reactive to crises, but also designed ex-ante to reduce the likelihood
and limit the severity of such crises.
In this paper, we inform the design of multinational banking regulation by developing a quanti-
tative structural model of global banking, and by using it to evaluate the effects of counterfactual
policies. We focus our analysis on global banks because they are often the largest players in the
countries where they operate: as noted by Goldberg (2009), the sheer size of foreign banking insti-
tutions and their involvement with the real economy makes them important vehicles for the global
transmission of shocks. For example, the Japanese banking crisis in the early 1990s had a substan-
tial effect on credit supply in the United States, as many US branches and subsidiaries of Japanese
banks closed down following the shock in their home country. The European sovereign debt crisis
also had rippling effects in the US credit markets, mostly due to the fragility of foreign branches’
funding, as our empirical analysis shows below. Several empirical studies have explored the role of
multinational banks in the transmission of shocks across countries.1 Our paper contributes to this
literature in two ways. First, while prior contributions have overlooked the importance of a bank’s
mode of operations, our model provides a microfoundation for the bank’s decision of whether and
how to enter a foreign market—through branches or subsidiaries. We find that this differentiation
is of first-order importance to understanding the effects of financial crises. Second, while most of
the existing work has been conducted using reduced-form analysis, our quantitative model enables
us to study the consequences of potential regulatory changes via counterfactual analysis.
The model we develop is designed to describe the institutional details of the banking industry
and to be consistent with a number of stylized facts from US bank-level data. For this reason,
our analysis focuses on the two most prominent forms of foreign banking institutions in the United
States: branches and subsidiaries. Current US bank regulations treat foreign-owned branches and
subsidiaries differently, so the activities that a branch and a subsidiary are allowed to undertake
differ: for example, while subsidiaries are separately capitalized, branches do not raise independent
1See most notably Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011, 2012a,b).
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equity and are subject to capital requirements only at the global bank holding company level. While
subsidiaries can issue all types of deposits, branches can issue only uninsured wholesale deposits.
Finally, unlike subsidiaries, branches can freely transfer funds to and from their parent.2
The distinction between branches and subsidiaries is important, both for the selection of different
banks in these two organizational modes, and for their different responses to shocks. We show that
the European parents of global banking conglomerates with affiliates in the United States tend
to be larger than those European banks without operations in the United States. Moreover, the
parent banks of foreign subsidiaries are systematically larger than the parent banks of foreign
branches. At the affiliate level, subsidiaries also are larger than branches. These size rankings
hold when evaluated in terms of deposits, loans, and total assets. To study the extent of shock
transmission, we analyze the response of US-based affiliates of European banks to the European
sovereign debt crisis. We find that, in the wake of the crisis, US branches of exposed European
banks experienced a flight in their uninsured deposits, while deposits at subsidiaries (both insured
and uninsured) grew. Because the shortage of funding that branches experienced was only partially
compensated by intrafirm transfers of funds from their parents, US branches of exposed European
banks experienced a decrease in their assets. At the same time, assets increased in exposed US
subsidiaries. These facts inform the construction of the model.
The bank’s problem is modeled as a monopolistically competitive extension of the Monti-Klein
model (see Klein 1971, and Monti 1972), augmented to include institutional features like capital
requirements and deposit insurance. The model explicitly distinguishes foreign banking institutions
by their mode of operations, which is endogenous and responds to differences in the regulatory
environment and in bank management efficiency. This feature allows us to assess whether the
mode of operations matters for the severity of shocks’ transmission across countries. The model
features the channels of adjustment that we document in the data, and its simple structure is
amenable to quantification. We calibrate the model to match a set of cross-sectional moments of
the US foreign banking sector and show that our calibrated economy generates responses to shocks
that are consistent with the actual responses of multinational banks to the European sovereign
debt crisis. We then use the model to perform counterfactual exercises that shed light on the
quantitative implications of current and counterfactual banking regulations for the transmission of
shocks across countries.
2In the remainder of this paper, as an analogy to the literature on multinational corporations, we refer to a parent
or parent bank as the home-based subsidiary of the global bank holding company.
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Our baseline quantitative exercise consists of an analysis of the European sovereign debt crisis.
In the model, the crisis is isomorphic to a sudden decline in the probability of loan repayment
in Europe. This decline reduces European banks’ profits and equity accumulation, lowers their
equity to risk-weighted assets ratio, and tightens the banks’ buffer on capital requirements. To
examine the effect of this change in the balance sheets of European banks on the operations of
their US-based affiliates, we model deposit supply following the empirical evidence reported in
Egan, Hortacsu, and Matvos (2017): on the one hand, a tightening in global conglomerates’ capital
reduces the supply of wholesale deposits, which represents a funding shock for US branches. Faced
with solvency problems in their foreign branches, European parents use their internal capital market
to support profitable lending in their US branches. Nonetheless, US branches decrease their total
assets. On the other hand, foreign subsidiaries’ balance sheets are more isolated from the shock
that affects their parents. As a result, there is no direct effect on their assets and liabilities.
The model is conceptually simple, yet rich in its depiction of the regulatory framework. Given its
success at replicating the observed response of foreign banking organizations (henceforth, FBOs)
to the European sovereign debt crisis, we use the model to simulate the response to the crisis
under counterfactual policy scenarios. The results of our exercises suggest that increased capital
requirements, the elimination of branching, or an ad hoc monetary policy intervention would have
mitigated the negative effects of the crisis on US aggregate lending. Conversely, the elimination of
subsidiarization would have caused an even more severe decline in banking activity in the United
States.
Our model also has interesting implications about the possible response of FBOs to “large”
shocks to their parents. More precisely, frictions to the internal capital market between parents
and subsidiaries imply that, following a “large” shock, a parent bank may decide to repatriate funds
by shutting down its foreign subsidiaries. The parents of branches do not have the same incentives,
as they can freely repatriate funds through their internal capital market. As an external validation
of this mechanism, we show that subsidiaries are more likely than branches to exit a foreign market,
and that exits are more common in periods when the parents’ equity positions are declining.
Taken together, the results illustrate the consequences that different organizational forms have
for the transmission of financial shocks across countries. Subsidiarization isolates a global bank’s
balance sheets by location; hence, it minimizes cross-country contagion. However, by not having
access to a fluid internal capital market within the conglomerate, subsidiaries do not provide an
effective instrument to dampen the global effect of shocks, resulting in possible reorganizations and
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exits. Conversely, parent-branch conglomerates can more easily take advantage of their internal
capital market, smooth the intensity of shocks across countries, and reduce their global impact.
This paper is related to a large empirical literature that studies the role of global banks as
vehicles of shock transmission across countries. In a seminal contribution, Peek and Rosengren
(2000) have shown the role that US-based branches of Japanese banks played in transmitting the
effect of the Japanese banking crisis to the United States. In a similar spirit, Cetorelli and Goldberg
(2011) document a decline in lending by foreign affiliates of global banks in emerging economies in
the wake of the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012a,b) point to the internal
capital markets of global banking conglomerates as a channel that strongly contributed to spreading
financial shocks during the 2007–2009 crisis. The possibility that parents and branches transfer
funds across borders but within the boundaries of the bank holding company is a feature of primary
importance in the framework that we present in this paper.
By presenting stylized facts about the features distinguishing multinational from nonmultina-
tional banks, our analysis is also closely related to Claessens, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001)
and Niepmann (2018). Our structural model focuses on two alternative forms of foreign banking:
branching and subsidiarization. In this dimension, our work is related to Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia, and Per´ıa
(2007), Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2010), Fiechter et al. (2011), and Danisewicz, Reinhardt, and Sowerbutts
(2017). Some of the facts that we report, related to changes in foreign branches’ balance sheets
in the wake of the European sovereign debt crisis, are present also in Correa, Sapriza, and Zlate
(2016). We explicitly compare changes in branches’ balance sheets to changes in the balance sheets
of subsidiaries.
There is a small but growing literature that uses tools from international trade theory to study
the operations of multinational banks. The seminal paper by Eaton (1994) sets the direction for
structural research on this topic, but the first contributions to this agenda are in the pioneering
work by Niepmann (2015, 2018). Our framework shares with Niepmann (2018) the emphasis on
within-country bank heterogeneity and on the role of endogenous selection to understand aggre-
gate outcomes in the global banking sector. The role of bank heterogeneity is also prominent in
de Blas and Russ (2013) and Bremus et al. (2013), which both show evidence of granularity in the
banking sector. Finally, this paper shares with Corbae and D’Erasmo (2013) the emphasis on using
quantitative analysis to understand features of the banking data.
There has been an increasing concern about the unintended cross-border effects of policy actions,
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and global banks play an important role in the international transmission of shocks. In an empirical
analysis of the spillovers of national banking regulations across borders, Berrospide et al. (2017) find
that tighter banking regulations shift lending away from countries where the tightening occurs. In
particular, subsidiaries and branches of banks domiciled in the tightening country play an important
role in the transmission mechanism. A similar argument is made in Ongena, Owen, and Temesvary
(2018), who study the transmission of US monetary policy across borders through the foreign
lending operations of multinational banks headquartered in the United States. We contribute to this
literature by examining the potential effects of alternative banking regulations in our quantitative
analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the data and documents
stylized facts about foreign banking institutions operating in the US market. Section 3 develops
a simple model that illustrates the decisions that multinational banks face. The model is then
calibrated and used to perform counterfactual exercises in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Foreign Banks in the United States: Stylized Facts
2.1 Data
This analysis relies on bank-level data obtained from a variety of sources. Our main source is the
Quarterly Report of Condition and Income that every US bank is required to file (also known as
“Call Reports”). In addition to domestic banks, US-based subsidiaries of foreign banks must fill out
these reports as well.3 We also use the quarterly “Report of Assets and Liabilities of US Branches
and Agencies of Foreign Banks” that every branch and agency of a foreign bank is required to
file.4 Call Reports data include detailed information about a foreign bank’s US operations, and
the ultimate owner’s identity, which allows us to distinguish US-based entities belonging to foreign-
owned global banks from US-owned banks.
In order to have a full picture of global banks’ operations at home and abroad, we merge the Call
3The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) collects these data in two different reporting
forms: FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041. Banks with foreign offices must file the FFIEC 031 form and banks with only
domestic offices must file the FFIEC 041 form. The information about domestic operations is identical across reports
for all practical purposes. Appendix A summarizes the US regulatory framework and the changes it underwent in the
past decades, with special focus on those regulations that had an impact on foreign banks operating in the United
States. Changes to these regulations do not affect the approach and classification that we use in this paper.
4Form FFIEC 002 is similar to the Call Reports, but it also contains the balances “due from” and “due to” the
head office (parent) and related depository institutions, wherever located.
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Reports data with two additional data sources: S&P Global Market Intelligence, which provides
regulatory reporting data and accounting data filed by the foreign parents of US-based subsidiaries
and branches, and the reported sovereign debt holdings of European banks provided as part of the
European Banking Authority’s (EBA) Stress Test information. As a result of this data merger,
we obtain a sample of 56 European banks that are the ultimate owners of US-based affiliates. At
the ultimate owner level, we consolidate all the offices of the same type (i.e., all subsidiaries and
all branches). These merged data allow us to present evidence about the response to shocks by
different entities of the same global banking conglomerate that are located in different countries.
Since the core of our empirical analysis focuses on how global banks responded to the European
sovereign debt crisis, we restrict our sample period to 2007–2013.
2.2 The Cross-Section of Foreign Banks
Foreign institutions have a substantial presence in the US banking market. Of the aggregate assets
held by banks operating in the United States, between 15 and 20 percent belong to banking offices
that are ultimately owned by a foreign parent. Foreign-owned banking offices account for about 20
percent of total deposits and between 20 and 30 percent of total commercial and industrial loans
in the United States (see Figure C.1 in the Appendix for more details).
What are the activities of FBOs in the United States? The answer is complex, as a foreign bank
may operate in the US market under different organizational forms, associated with very different
activities and—most importantly—different regulations. A foreign bank may open a subsidiary
bank, which for most purposes operates as a domestically owned US banking entity. A subsidiary
is subject to US regulation, raises independent equity, and is subject to independent capital re-
quirements. A subsidiary may accept both wholesale deposits and retail deposits insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).5 Any capital flows between the subsidiary and the
foreign parent must happen “at arm’s length,” in the form of loans, equity injections, or capital
distributions (dividends). This means that if a foreign parent wants to transfer funds to or from
a subsidiary in the United States, there is no fluid internal channel to do so.6 In our dataset, we
5Deposits in subsidiaries are classified as retail if they are under the FDIC threshold ($100,000 until 2005 and
$250,000 thereafter). Wholesale deposits are those above the FDIC threshold.
6Equity injections are rare and subject to the home regulator. Equity flows to the parent are in the form of
dividend distributions, which are limited by earnings and are typically semiannual. Recently, these distributions are
even more limited by the performance in the stress testing exercise for those subsidiaries with more than $50 billion
in assets.
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count 47 US-based subsidiaries of foreign banks, with total assets of approximately $1.16tn, which
represent 7.1 percent of all bank assets in the United States. Out of these 47 subsidiaries, 17 are
ultimately owned by European banks, with total assets of $0.68tn in the United States.
The other most common form of operations is via branching: a branch is also subject to US
regulations, but unlike a subsidiary does not raise independent equity. A branch is only subject to
capital requirements at the conglomerate level in its home country (i.e., branch assets are consol-
idated with the foreign parent assets when evaluating the conglomerate’s capital ratio). Branches
may make loans, but may only accept uninsured wholesale deposits.7 Unlike subsidiaries, branches
have an intrafirm channel to transfer capital flows to/from the parent, and do display large in-
trafirm capital flows with their foreign parents (more on this below). In our dataset, there are 182
US-based branches of foreign banks, with total assets of approximately $2.19tn, which represent
15 percent of all bank assets in the United States. Out of these 182 US-based branches, 62 are
ultimately owned by European banks, with total assets of $1.19tn in the United States.
Subsidiaries and branches are the two most common ways that foreign banks operate in the US
banking system. Taken together, subsidiaries and branches represent more than 99 percent of the
assets held by foreign-owned banking offices. In terms of business lines, these two forms of entry
also entail activities that are close to those of traditional banks.8
Our description of the foreign banking sector in the United States begins by showing that
there is selection by size akin to what is observed for multinational firms operating in nonbanking
sectors. Figure 1 compares European parents of US-based FBOs and European banks without US
operations in terms of loans, deposits, and overall assets.9 It is evident that the European banks
that enter the US market through affiliates are larger than the ones that do not.10 Niepmann
7Branches do not have their own balance sheet, as it is consolidated into the balance sheet of the parent institution.
Branches do not have a capital account, and are not required to report income statement variables. Nonetheless, the
US regulatory framework requires foreign-owned branches and agencies to report their assets and liabilities in the
FFIEC 002 form.
8In addition to branches and subsidiaries, the data display two more types of organizations. Edge and agreement
corporations cannot engage in business in the United States with US-based entities and are precluded from making
domestic loans or accepting domestic deposits. Representative offices and nondepository trusts do not accept deposits
or give loans, and their asset holdings are negligible compared with the other types of foreign entities. Given their
small weight in aggregate banking activities, we drop edge and agreement corporations, representative offices, and
nondepository trusts from our sample and focus the analysis on foreign-owned branches and subsidiaries.
9The assets side of a bank’s balance sheet includes many types of loans: wholesale (commercial and industrial
loans, real estate loans, and loans to other financial institutions) and retail (mortgages, home equity, auto loans,
and credit cards). In addition, other assets held by banks are securities (US treasuries, residential and commercial
mortgage-backed securities, other asset-backed securities, and a small amount of stocks) and trading assets. The
liabilities side includes deposits, short-term and long-term debt, and owners’ equity.
10To properly argue about selection by size, ideally we would be comparing foreign parents of US-based FBOs and
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Figure 1: Foreign Parents versus Foreign Nonmultinational Banks
Comparison of size measures of foreign parents of US-based FBOs (subsidiaries and branches)
versus European banks without US operations. Data are in trillions of US dollars.
Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence data for top-tier parents of US branches and subsidiaries
from Europe.
(2018) presents evidence of a similar pecking order based on bank efficiency (computed as the ratio
of overhead costs to total assets). Multinational banks appear to be systematically more efficient
than nonmultinational banks. The model that we present in the next section features a positive
relationship between bank efficiency and bank size, consistent with Figure 1. The figure further
distinguishes parents of foreign subsidiaries from parents of foreign branches, and shows that the
parents of foreign subsidiaries are on average larger banks compared with the parents of foreign
branches.
At the affiliate level, there are large size differences between subsidiaries and branches of FBOs.
Figure 2 reports the average size of deposits, loans, and overall assets held by a US branch or
subsidiary of a European bank. When comparing FBOs, the average subsidiary is substantially
larger than the average branch in terms of deposits, loans, and overall assets. Size differences are
persistent over the sample period, and are not driven by a few firms with extraordinarily large
foreign banks without operations abroad. Unfortunately, the available data do not allow us to distinguish foreign
nonmultinational banks from foreign parents of FBOs located in countries other than the United States. However,
we argue that since the United States is one of the most popular markets for the activities of multinational banks, if
foreign banks do not have US operations, it is unlikely that they have significant operations in other foreign markets.
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Figure 2: US-Based Branches versus US-Based Subsidiaries of Foreign Banks
Comparison of size measures of US-based subsidiaries and branches of FBOs. Data are in billions
of US dollars.
Source: US Structure Data for US Offices of Foreign Banking Organizations - Selected Assets and
Liabilities of Domestic and Foreign-Owned US Commercial Banks plus US Branches and Agencies
of Foreign Banks.
balance sheets: the deposits, loans, and assets size distributions of foreign subsidiaries first-order
stochastically dominate the analogous distributions of foreign branches (see Figure C.2 in the
Appendix).
Finally, Figure C.3 in the Appendix shows that the amount of assets foreign banks hold in the
United States is positively related to their domestic size, indicating that banks that are “big” in
their home country also have large foreign operations. This fact motivates an important assumption
of the model: that banks transfer their efficiency to their foreign affiliates.
2.3 Foreign Banks’ Response to Shocks
We use the European sovereign debt crisis as a natural experiment to analyze how global banks
respond to shocks and the extent to which these institutions transmit shocks across countries.
The analysis in this section is similar in spirit to the one in Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012b) and
Correa, Sapriza, and Zlate (2016), but with an emphasis on the distinction between foreign sub-
9
sidiaries and foreign branches operating in the United States. In a nutshell, we find that after the
European sovereign debt crisis: 1) US-based branches of exposed European banks reduced their
assets in the United States while US-based subsidiaries of exposed European banks did not expe-
rience a decline in assets; 2) the probability that a US branch received an intrafirm transfer from
an exposed parent increased, and the amount of the transfer increased; and 3) there was a flight of
uninsured wholesale deposits from the US branches of exposed European parents, while both the
insured and uninsured deposits of US subsidiaries of exposed European parents were not affected.
We start by assessing the differential response of branches versus subsidiaries by looking at their
assets. For this purpose, we run the following regression:
aeb,t = α+ β1Crisist + β2Expb + β3Crisist × Expb + δc + ε
e
b,t, (1)
where aeb,t is the natural log of total assets of entity e belonging to bank b at time t. An entity
is either an aggregate of US-based branches or an aggregate of US-based subsidiaries belonging
to a European banking conglomerate b. We run the regression separately for branches and for
subsidiaries. The dummy variable Crisist takes the value of 1 for all quarter-years after 2011
(included), while the dummy variable Expb takes the value of 1 when parent bank b of entity e
is exposed to Greek, Italian, Irish, Portuguese, or Spanish (GIIPS) sovereign debt. We classify a
bank as exposed if it has GIIPS sovereign debt holdings above the sample median.11 The regression
includes parent country fixed effects, denoted by δc, to exploit variation in asset holdings across
banks from the same host country. The results are reported in Table 1 and show that, after the
European sovereign debt crisis, US branches of exposed European banks decreased their assets in
the United States, while the assets of US subsidiaries of exposed European banks were unaffected.12
Given that the sovereign debt crisis affected the balance sheets of the European parents of these
FBOs, one might think that the drop in assets of their US-based branches was associated with an
11The chain of events in 2010 resulted in a fear of contagion regarding sovereign default in the GIIPS countries
which, at the same time, fueled concerns about the stability of the euro and the euro zone more broadly. As Figure
C.4 in the Appendix illustrates, exposed banks were headquartered in many countries in Europe, not only the GIIPS.
Our results are robust to alternative definitions of exposed banks. In particular, we also performed the empirical
analysis reported in this section using the following alternative definitions of “exposed parent”: i) classify a bank
as exposed if it has positive GIIPS sovereign debt holdings, ii) classify a bank as exposed if from a country in the
euro zone. We define exposure using these coarse dummies rather than using exposure levels as explanatory variables
because GIIPS sovereign debt holdings constitute a very small share of these banks’ balance sheets: among exposed
parents, the mean (median) exposure is only 3.07 percent (1.7 percent) of assets. For this reason, we do not think
that variation in the intensive margin of exposure drives the different responses of banks to the crisis.
12For robustness, we also run the regression pooling observations of branches and subsidiaries, identifying differential
responses to the crisis via triple interaction terms. The results are unchanged. We prefer to present the results of the
two separate regressions to ease the interpretation of the coefficients of interest.
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Table 1: Intensive Margin of Assets: Branches versus Subsidiaries
ln(Total Assets)
Subsidiaries Branches
Crisis 0.103 0.133
(0.115) (0.223)
Exp 1.983∗∗∗ 1.674∗∗
(0.351) (0.724)
Crisis× Exp 0.0847 –0.622∗∗
(0.234) (0.231)
Country FE Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 914 2,683
R2 0.585 0.288
internal transfer of resources from the United States to Europe. The left panel of Figure 3 shows
the evolution of the aggregate net flows to and from related institutions. From 1995 to 2011, the
amounts that European parent banks were borrowing from their US branches were much larger than
the amounts that US branches were borrowing from their European parents. This pattern is consis-
tent with the evidence shown by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012a,b) and Correa, Sapriza, and Zlate
(2016) about foreign branches being a source of funding to their US parents. The pattern sharply
reverts at the onset of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011. The right panel of Figure 3
illustrates the intrafirm flows broken down between exposed and nonexposed banks. It is evident
from the figure that the sign reversal in intrafirm capital flows between parents and branches is
mostly due to FBOs whose parents were exposed to the crisis.13
We run the following regressions to establish more precisely the sharp distinction between
intrafirm flows of exposed versus nonexposed European banks with foreign branches:
T eb,t = α+ β1Crisist + β2Expb + β3Crisist × Expb + δc + ε
e
b,t. (2)
To study both the intensive and extensive margin of the intrafirm transfers, Te,b,t is either a
dummy variable taking the value one if parent bank b has a claim on branch e’s assets in period t
(zero if the branch has a claim on the parent), or the size of the intrafirm transfer of parent bank
b to branch e at time t. The other variables have been defined above.
The results are reported in Table 2, and show that at the onset of the European sovereign debt
13Figure C.4 in the Appendix illustrates the breakdown of intrafirm flows by origin country.
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Figure 3: Net Intrafirm Flows for Foreign Branches of European Banks
The plot shows the difference between net due from related depository institutions and net due to
related depository institutions (items 2 and 5, respectively, from the “Schedule RAL - Assets and
Liabilities”). Data are in billions of US dollars.
Source: Report of Assets and Liabilities of US Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks (FFIEC
002).
Table 2: Intensive and Extensive Margin of Intrafirm Transfers between European
Parents and their US Branches
prob(T > 0) T
Crisis 0.283∗∗∗ 1,354
(0.0522) (1,301)
Exp –0.854∗∗∗ –11,320∗∗∗
(0.100) (3,577)
Crisis× Exp 0.949∗∗∗ 18,315∗∗∗
(0.170) (5,081)
Constant 0.0810∗∗∗
(0.0296)
Country FE No Yes
No. of Obs. 3,000 2,976
R2 0.0333 0.176
12
crisis, both the intensive and the extensive margin of the intrafirm transfer between a European
parent and its US branches were affected as long as the parent was exposed to GIIPS debt. The
probability that a US branch received an intrafirm transfer from the exposed parent increased, and
the amount of the transfer also increased.
So far we have documented a drop in assets for US branches accompanied by a transfer of
resources from the already-exposed European parents to their branches. To shed light on this
apparent puzzle, we examine the funding side of US FBOs’ balance sheets by running regressions
of deposits on a set of dummies that are analogous to the ones previously used:
deb,t = α+ β1Crisist + β2Expb + β3Crisist × Expb + δc + ε
e
i,t, (3)
where dei,t is the natural log of total deposits of entity e at time t. We run three separate regressions:
one for retail insured deposits, which are accepted only by subsidiaries, one for wholesale uninsured
deposits held by subsidiaries, and one for wholesale uninsured deposits held by branches.
The results are shown in Table 3. Retail deposits in exposed subsidiaries appear to be unaffected
by the crisis. More interestingly, the flight in wholesale deposits that other papers have documented
appears to be unique to branches owned by exposed European parents. On the contrary, wholesale
deposits increased in US subsidiaries owned by exposed European parents. Other papers14 have
documented the flight of wholesale deposits during the European sovereign debt crisis, but did
not highlight the different responses depending on the organizational form of the banks accepting
them. Table 3 suggests that the flight affected only those wholesale deposits that were held in
branches, indicating that this less-regulated organizational form was perceived as less stable by
large wholesale depositors.
The results of this analysis depict a scenario in which distress among some European parents
was associated with a flight of uninsured deposits from their foreign branches in the United States.
The reaction on the funding side of foreign branches has the effect of changing the direction of
intrafirm banking flows: foreign branches appeared to be a source of funding to their parents
until 2011, while after the crisis parents started acting as a source of funding to their branches.
This evidence indicates that branching appears to transmit shocks across countries more than sub-
sidiarization does, as the latter institutional arrangement effectively isolates FBOs from potential
distress affecting their parents.
14See Correa, Sapriza, and Zlate (2016); Egan, Hortacsu, and Matvos (2017).
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Table 3: Intensive Margin of Wholesale and Retail Deposits; Branches vs. Subsidiaries
Subsidiaries Branches
ln(Retail Deposits) ln(Wholesale Deposits) ln(Wholesale Deposits)
Crisis 0.403∗∗∗ 0.000503 0.106
(0.154) (0.138) (0.241)
Exp 1.740∗∗∗ 1.581∗∗∗ 2.323∗∗∗
(0.469) (0.421) (0.309)
Crisis× Exp 0.480 0.189 –1.340∗∗∗
(0.312) (0.283) (0.346)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 914 906 2,382
R2 0.454 0.463 0.244
In the next section we introduce a structural model of foreign banking that is consistent with
the institutional features of the foreign banking sector in the United States and with the empirical
evidence presented so far in this paper.
3 A Model of Foreign Banking
This section introduces a simple model that illustrates the main tradeoffs that a bank faces when
deciding whether and how to operate in a foreign country. We extend the Monti-Klein model
(see Klein 1971, and Monti 1972) to a setting with monopolistic competition among heterogeneous
banks, featuring the institutional characteristics of different bank types. The model enables us to
understand banks’ decisions as responses to various shocks and the consequences of these choices
for the banking sector in aggregate, and lays the ground for the quantitative analysis developed in
the next section.
3.1 Setup
The model economy is composed of two countries, Home and Foreign. Variables referring to the
Foreign country are denoted by an asterisk (∗). Each country is populated by a large mass of
banks. In addition, each bank may open an affiliate in the other country, either as a branch or as
a subsidiary, and thus become the parent of a multinational bank.
In order to examine the effect of shocks like the European sovereign debt crisis, we develop the
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model with two periods. In the first period, each bank chooses whether and how to operate in the
foreign market, makes profits, and accumulates equity. We label a “local bank” as a bank that
chooses not to operate in the foreign market. At the end of the first period, an unexpected shock
hits the economy, affecting equity accumulation and the decisions banks make in the second period.
We start by modeling the profit maximization problem of a bank conditional on each one of
the three international status choices: local bank, parent with foreign subsidiary, or parent with
foreign branch. Once the tradeoffs driving a bank’s optimal decisions conditional on its status are
well understood, we model selection into international status. A bank enters the foreign market if,
by doing so, it will make higher profits than if it operated only domestically.
In the domestic market, each bank offers one-period loans (L). With a certain probability
of default (1 − p) loans are delinquent and the principal is not repaid. Each bank also accepts
deposits (D), and borrows/lends in the interbank market (M). We assume that every bank has
market power in the market for loans, originating from some type of differentiation (e.g., spatial or
product). This differentiation, together with customers’ love of variety in banking products, is the
rationale for why many banks coexist in the economy. Banks are heterogeneous in the efficiency
with which they manage their activities, and operate under monopolistic competition in the market
for loans and deposits. For simplicity, the interbank market is assumed to be perfectly competitive.
We do not model domestic entry: all banks operate and make nonnegative profits in their home
market.
During each period, banks incur a cost to manage deposits and loans described by the cost
function a ·C(D,L). The bank-specific efficiency parameter a is the source of heterogeneity across
banks, and it affects the management cost function multiplicatively, so that “low a” banks are more
efficient than “high a” banks. Moreover, each bank is endowed with a given amount of equity E(a),
which is a function of bank efficiency.
In order to assess the importance of regulatory banking policies for the response to shocks, we
model deposit insurance and capital requirements. In the United States, for example, all banks
accepting retail deposits have to pay deposit insurance to the FDIC, which determines the deposit
insurance premium (IP ), or assessment, on a risk basis. A bank’s assessment is calculated by
multiplying its assessment rate by its assessment base, where a bank’s assessment base is equal to
its average consolidated total assets minus its average tangible equity. In our model, the assessment
rate is a function expressing the bank’s ability to withstand funding and asset stress, so we assume
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the assessment rate is a function of the bank’s equity and liabilities:
IP (D,L,M) = fp(D,M
−, E(a))︸ ︷︷ ︸
assessment rate
· (L+M+ − E(a))︸ ︷︷ ︸
assessment base
, (4)
where M+ (M−) denotes interbank lending (borrowing).15
Banks are subject to capital requirements every period, i.e., there is a lower bound on the ratio
of equity to risk-weighted assets that they are allowed to sustain:
E(a)
ωLL+ ωMM+
≥ k, (5)
where the value of k is set in the United States under the implementation of the Basel II/Basel
III Accords. The parameters ωL and ωM are appropriate weights that reflect the riskiness of a
bank’s loans and investments, and are determined by the regulatory agencies (in the US case, by
the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).
Based on the evidence presented in Section 2, we assume that when a bank enters the Foreign
market, it transfers its efficiency 1/a to the new affiliate. Entering the Foreign market involves a
fixed cost, that is higher if the bank enters with a subsidiary rather than a branch: Fs > Fb > 0.
The fixed costs of opening a subsidiary may include the cost of setting up a network of affiliates,
acquiring customers, and learning about the host country’s regulatory framework. As the activities
of branches are more limited compared to those of subsidiaries, we assume that the fixed cost of
branching is lower than the fixed cost of subsidiarization. If a bank enters the Foreign market as
a subsidiary, the subsidiary performs exactly the same operations as the parent does in the Home
country: it accepts retail deposits, issues loans, makes investments, borrows/lends in the interbank
market, holds independent equity, and it is subject to its own capital requirements. We also assume
that the subsidiary faces operating costs analogous to the ones of the parent.
Conversely, if a bank enters the Foreign market by opening a branch, the activities of the
affiliate differ from those of the parent. Branches do not raise independent equity, they are not
subject to capital requirements, and can only accept uninsured wholesale deposits. Following
Egan, Hortacsu, and Matvos (2017), we assume that the supply of uninsured deposits is less elastic
than the supply of insured deposits, and that uninsured deposits are sensitive to a measure of
“distress” experienced by the banking corporation, while insured deposits are not similarly affected.
15Appendix D contains more institutional details about the calculation of deposit insurance assessments.
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Finally, there exists an intrafirm channel linking the assets and liabilities of the parent and
its branch: parents of foreign branches can borrow from or lend to their branches at no cost.
Conversely, since transfers between parents and subsidiaries present more frictions, we assume that
parents and their subsidiaries can trade only at arm’s length via the interbank market.
3.2 Local Banks
A local bank chooses the optimal amounts of loans, L, interbank activity, M , and deposits, D, to
maximize its profits:
max
L,D,M
p · rL(L) · L− (1− p)L+ rMM − rD(D) ·D − aC(D,L)− IP (D,L,M) (6)
s.t. E(a) +D ≥ L+M (resource constraint)
E(a)
ωLL+ ωMM+
≥ k (capital requirement),
where rL(L), denotes a downward-sloping demand for loans, and p ∈ (0, 1) is the probability of
loan repayment. The function rD(D) is an upward-sloping supply of insured retail deposits,
16 while
rM is the interbank rate, which the bank takes as exogenous, but is endogenously determined in
industry equilibrium. Each bank maximizes the profits generated by its activities subject to two
constraints. First, its assets must not exceed its liabilities (the resource constraint). Second, the
ratio of equity to risk-weighted assets must be maintained above the capital requirement, k. Notice
also that the bank’s management cost and its equity level depend on the bank’s efficiency, which
is the exogenous source of heterogeneity in the model.
In normal times, we observe in the data that banks choose to operate with a buffer on their
capital requirements, i.e., capital requirement constraints are normally not binding.17 For this
reason, we assume that the equilibrium in normal times is one where the resource constraint binds,
but the capital requirement does not. We refer to this solution of the model as the “unconstrained
equilibrium.” The unconstrained equilibrium is characterized by an interior solution for (L,D),
16In the data, parent banks and their subsidiaries can accept all kinds of deposits, both wholesale and retail. For
simplicity, in the model we assume that parent banks and subsidiaries hold only retail deposits. The results are
robust to the removal of this simplifying assumption.
17Figure C.5 in the Appendix shows that banks in our sample have ratios of equity to risk-weighted assets well
above the capital requirements set by the regulators.
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described by the following first-order conditions:
[L] p
[
∂rL(L)
∂L
L+ rL(L)
]
= a
∂C(·)
∂L
+
∂IP (·)
∂L
+ (1− p) + rM
[D]
[
∂rD(D)
∂D
D + rD(D)
]
+ a
∂C(·)
∂D
+
∂IP (·)
∂D
= rM ,
where the functions’ arguments have been omitted to simplify the notation. The resource constraint
pins down interbank activity: M = E(a) +D − L.
The first-order conditions are intuitive. A bank chooses the optimal amount of loans such that
the marginal revenue from lending is equal to the sum of the marginal costs of loans and deposit
insurance, the expected marginal loss from delinquent loans, and the opportunity cost of forgone
alternatives, namely lending to other financial institutions in the interbank market. Similarly,
optimal deposits are set such that their “total” marginal cost, inclusive of management costs and
the insurance premium, is equal to the marginal cost of borrowing in the interbank market. In
Appendix D, we illustrate that by making some simple parametric assumptions, a bank’s maximal
profit is an increasing function of the bank’s efficiency, 1/a, and the bank’s equity, E(a).
In the model, shocks to the economy may induce situations where the capital constraint of
a local bank is binding. We refer to this scenario as the model’s “constrained equilibrium” and
present its detailed solution in Appendix D.
3.3 The Parent-Subsidiary Pair
Given that foreign-owned subsidiaries are de facto US banks, a parent-subsidiary pair solves vir-
tually the same profit maximization problem that a local bank faces in each market in which it
operates, albeit with two differences: first, upon establishing the subsidiary, the parent transfers a
share of its equity, sEE(a), in order for the subsidiary to be initially capitalized. Subsequently, the
two entities accumulate equity independently. Second, operating a foreign subsidiary also entails a
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fixed cost FS > 0. Hence, a parent-subsidiary pair solves:
max
L,D,M
L∗,D∗,M∗
prL(L) · L− (1− p)L+ rMM − rD(D) ·D − aC(D,L)− IP (D,L,M) + ...
p∗r∗L(L
∗) · L∗ − (1− p∗)L∗ + rMM
∗ − r∗D(D
∗)D∗ − aC(D∗, L∗)− IP (D∗, L∗,M∗)− FS
(7)
s.t. (1− sE)E(a) +D ≥ L+M
sEE(a) +D
∗ ≥ L∗ +M∗
(1− sE)E(a)
ωLL+ ωMM+
≥ k
sEE(a)
ωLL∗ + ωMM∗
+ ≥ k,
where asterisks denote foreign-market variables. Notice that all markets are segmented, except for
the interbank market, which is a frictionless international market, clearing at the rate rM . We also
assume that the deposit insurance premium, the capital requirement, and the risk weights on assets
are symmetric across countries.
Given that the country-level profit functions associated with the two entities forming the pair
are identical, the equilibrium for each entity of a parent-subsidiary pair takes the same form as the
equilibrium for a local bank, with the appropriate equity levels, both in the unconstrained and in
the constrained case.
3.4 The Parent-Branch Pair
When a parent bank enters the Foreign market with a branch, the possibility of intrafirm transfers
between parent and branch and the conglomerate’s aggregate capital requirement link the decisions
of the two entities. A parent-branch pair solves:
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max
L,D,M,T
L∗,D∗
prL(L) · L− (1− p)L+ rMM − rD(D) ·D − aC(D,L)− IP (D,L,M)+
...p∗r∗L∗(L
∗) · L∗ − (1− p∗)L∗ − r∗wD
(
D∗w;
(
E(a)
k ·RWA
))
·D∗w − aC(D
∗
w, L
∗)− FB (8)
s.t. E(a) +D ≥ L+M + T
D∗w + T ≥ L
∗
E(a)
ωL(L+ L∗) + ωMM+
≥ k,
where FB > 0 is the fixed cost of operating a foreign branch, and T is the intrafirm transfer between
the two entities (T > 0 when the parent is lending to the branch).
The profit function reflects the institutional restrictions that make branches different from
local banks and subsidiaries. First, the balance sheet of a branch is effectively “merged” with
that of its parent: branches do not raise independent equity, do not operate independently in the
interbank market,18 and can transfer funds to/from the parent at no cost (T ). As a result, if a
branch has excess funds, it may transfer these funds to the parent to finance its domestic lending
(as it appears in the pre-crisis period). Similarly, a parent can fund its branch in the event of
a shortage of deposits (as it appears in the post-crisis period). Second, the lack of independent
equity requirements for branches implies that they are subject to capital requirements only at the
level of the entire conglomerate. Finally, on the liabilities side, branches can only accept uninsured
wholesale deposits. The term r∗wD
(
D∗w;
(
E(a)
k·RWA
))
is the supply of wholesale deposits, where RWA
denotes risk-weighted assets: RWA = ωL(L+ L
∗) + ωMM
+.
We rely on the estimates by Egan, Hortacsu, and Matvos (2017) and assume that the demand
for uninsured wholesale deposits is less elastic than the demand for insured retail deposits, and
that wholesale deposits are sensitive to some measure of “distress” experienced by the banking
organization. Our model-based measure of distress is inversely related to the buffer in the capital
requirement that banks hold in normal times, given by the ratio of equity to risk-weighted assets
(RWA) divided by the capital requirement k. When E(a)k·RWA = 1, the capital requirement is binding
and the bank experiences maximum distress, resulting in a flight of wholesale deposits. Distress
decreases as E(a)k·RWA grows bigger than one.
18All interbank activity M is managed by the parent.
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3.5 Industry Equilibrium and Equity Accumulation
Each country is populated by a continuum of banks that draw their bank-specific efficiency, 1/a,
from the exogenous distributions F (a) and F ∗(a). Selection into the Foreign market implies that
there are endogenous equilibrium distributions of banks operating in each country, which we denote
with G(a), G∗(a).
The interest rate in the interbank market is given by the market-clearing condition:
∫
M(a; rM )G(a)da +
∫
M∗(a; rM )G
∗(a)da = 0. (9)
Each bank starts the first period with a given level of equity, E(a), and accumulates equity over
time through reinvested profits:
E′(a) = E(a) + pi(a), (10)
where E′(a) denotes equity in the second period. Finally, banks exit the market if they reach
negative equity: if E′(a) < 0 for a local bank or for the parent of a conglomerate, then the entire
bank shuts down, while if E′(a) < 0 for a subsidiary, only the subsidiary shuts down.
3.6 Selection: Matching Cross-Sectional Facts
The simple model developed in this section is a useful tool to understand the tradeoffs that banks
face when entering foreign markets. The combination of bank-level efficiency with fixed and variable
costs of operation delivers selection of individual banks into the three possible types: local banks,
parent and subsidiary pairs, or parent and branch pairs. Notice that in the model, branching
and subsidiarization are alternative choices; hence, no bank chooses both options to operate in
a foreign market. This result is consistent with most of the observations in our sample. Among
the 47 European banks in our sample, 37 operate in the US market exclusively with branches or
exclusively with subsidiaries. Six of the remaining banks adopt both options, but have more than
70 percent of their assets in one organizational form.
The fixed costs associated with foreign operations imply that the largest and most efficient banks
become multinational banks, which is consistent with what we observe in the data (see Figure 1) and
with the features of multinational corporations in other sectors (see Bernard, Jensen, and Schott
2009). For the model to generate selection by size across the different organizational modes of
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multinational banking, there needs to be a tradeoff between the fixed versus variable costs of
branching compared to subsidiarization. Particularly, one obtains the observed selection of the
most (least) efficient global banks into subsidiarization (branching) if subsidiarization, compared
to branching, is associated with lower variable costs but higher fixed costs, as illustrated in Figure
4.
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Figure 4: Selection by Efficiency/Size into International and Organizational Status
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Differences in efficiency then directly translate into differences in the size of deposits, loans, and
assets, so that more efficient banks issue more loans, accept more deposits, and have more assets
than less efficient banks. By including the relative sizes of different bank types as target moments
of our calibration, we ensure that the model generates the same selection pattern that we observe
in the data: foreign subsidiaries are larger than foreign branches in terms of loans, deposits, and
overall assets.
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4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we quantify the model in order to use it for counterfactual analysis. We start by
calibrating the model to be consistent with the cross-sectional stylized facts presented in Section 2.
The calibrated model is able to reproduce the differential response of global banks with different
organizational structures to the shock we studied empirically, the European sovereign debt crisis.
To answer a set of policy-relevant questions, we perform a series of counterfactual exercises that
shed light on the strength and weaknesses of the current US regulatory framework.
4.1 Calibration
Our calibration exercise proceeds in three steps. First, a subset of the model’s parameters can be
directly matched to empirical observations or to previous studies. Second, we use the empirical
distribution of loans to discipline the parameters of the banks’ efficiency and equity distributions.
Third, we use the model to jointly calibrate the remaining parameters by matching some moments
of interest. Since we want to calibrate the economy prior to the European sovereign debt crisis, all
the data moments of interest are for the year 2010.
We parameterize the model to preserve tractability and make possible the identification of key
parameters. We assume a constant elasticity loan demand function: L(rL) = r
−ε
L A, where ε > 1
is the elasticity of loan demand, and A is a parameter describing the aggregate size of the loan
market. Similarly, we assume a constant-elasticity retail deposit supply function: D(rD) = r
ϑ
DB,
where ϑ > 0 is the elasticity of retail deposit supply, and B is a parameter describing the aggregate
size of the retail deposit market. For wholesale deposits, this specification is augmented to generate
responses to a measure of the banking conglomerate’s distress: Dw(r
w
D) = (r
w
D)
ϑw log
(
E(a)
k·RWA
)
Bw,
where ϑw < ϑ is the elasticity of wholesale deposits, and Bw is a parameter describing the aggregate
size of the wholesale deposit market. This functional form implies that the quantity of deposits
supplied decreases as the buffer on the capital requirement decreases, and that there is a complete
deposit flight (Dw = 0) when the capital requirement is binding. We assume that the management
cost function is linear: C(D,L) = cLL+ cDD, where cL, cD > 0, and postulate a parametric form
for the deposit insurance assessment, which broadly follows the FDIC Current Assessment Rate
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Calculator for Highly Complex Institutions:19
IP (D,L,M) =
[
Rmin + fp ·
M−
E(a)
]
· (L+M+ − E(a)). (11)
We directly calibrate the parameters p, Rmin, fp, k, ωL, ωM , ϑ, ϑw, and sE. In our model,
one minus the probability of loan repayment is equivalent to the bank’s expected loss per dollar,
which is equal to the probability of default multiplied by the loss given default (one minus the
recovery rate). The recovery rate is calibrated to a standard value of 40 percent, which in the event
of default implies that (1 − p) = 0.4. In normal times, we calibrate the probability of default to
a baseline value of 2.5 percent. This is an approximate middle-range measure based on estimated
probabilities of default on debt with credit ratings ranging from AAA to BB.20 Based on these
observations, we set the probability of loan repayment (in normal times) to 0.99 (1− 0.025 × 0.6).
Consistent with the assessment rates reported in Table D.1 in the Appendix, we set Rmin = 0.025
percent to match the minimum possible assessment rate in the scenario in which the bank lends in
the interbank market (M > 0), while fp = 0.0224 percent is set such that the bank will be assessed
the maximum possible rate if its capital constraint binds and if it relies on the money markets for
95 percent or more of its funding.
We set the capital requirement to k = 0.045, which is the Basel III capital requirement for
common equity over risk-weighted assets. The Basel II/Basel III regulation also gives guidelines
on the weights used to compute risk-weighted assets: we choose ωL = 0.5, based on corporate
loans, consumer loans, and residential mortgage exposures, and ωM = 0.1, based on risk weights
for exposures to US depository institutions and credit unions.
Egan, Hortacsu, and Matvos (2017) provide structural estimates of the elasticity of supply for
both the retail and wholesale deposit market in the United States. Since the way in which we
model deposit supply is a special parametric form of what they estimate, we use their estimated
elasticities and set ϑ = 0.56 and ϑw = 0.16.
Finally, in our dataset, a subsidiary’s equity is on average 11 percent of the equity of the parent.
As such, we set sE = 0.11. Table 4 summarizes the parameters that we calibrate directly from the
data. We also assume that these parameters are symmetric across the two countries.
19Appendix D contains more details about these parametric choices.
20Source: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/sr190.pdf.
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Table 4: Direct Calibration
Parameter Definition Value Source
p Probability of Loan Repayment 0.99 World Bank
Rmin, fp Insurance Premium Parameters 0.00025,0.000224 FDIC
k Capital Requirement 0.045 Basel II/III
ωL, ωM Risk Weights 0.5, 0.1 Basel II/III
sE Subsidiary’s Equity Share 0.11 Call Reports
ϑ, ϑw
Elasticities of Retail and
0.56, 0.16 Egan, Hortacsu, and Matvos (2017)
Wholesale Deposit Supply
In order to discipline the parameters of the banks’ efficiency distribution, we start by observing
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the empirical distribution of interest revenues from loans
is log-normal. In Appendix E, we show that if the banks’ efficiency distribution is log-normal with
mean µ and standard deviation σ, the distribution of interest revenues from loans is approximately
log-normal with mean µL = (ε− 1)µ+ log
[(
εcL
p(ε−1)
)1−ε
A
]
and standard deviation σL = (ε− 1)σ.
Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the empirical distribution of interest revenues
from loans deliver µL = 5.95 and σL = 1.93. Hence, we model a bank’s efficiency as a random draw
from a log-normal distribution whose parameters µ and σ are calibrated such that:
µL = (ε− 1)µ + log
[(
εcL
p(ε− 1)
)1−ε
A
]
= 5.96
σL = (ε− 1)σ = 1.93.
Banks are heterogeneous, both in their efficiency level and in their equity endowment. Given
that we observe nonbinding capital requirements in the data, we target a pre-crisis calibrated
economy that is populated by unconstrained banks. The empirical distribution of equity is well-
approximated by a log-normal distribution. Since the model abstracts from uses of equity other than
loans, we assume that each bank’s pre-crisis equity position is drawn from the same distribution as
its loans, scaled by the capital requirement (k=.045) plus a 4 percent capital buffer.21 We impose
this buffer because the 2008–2010 period coincides with the implementation of stress testing. As
banks were getting ready to undergo stress testing, their ratios of equity to risk-weighted assets
increased in this period (see Figure C.5 in the Appendix).
21We parameterize the buffer as the average hypothetical worst loss that a bank under stress would experience.
This assumption ensures that banks are “far” from the constraint in the pre-crisis equilibrium.
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It remains to calibrate the relative management cost of loans versus deposits cL/cD, the elasticity
of loan demand ε, the aggregate parameters of loan demand and deposit supply in each country
(A, A∗, B, B∗, Bw, and B
∗
w), and the fixed entry costs FS and FB . Since we cannot calibrate these
parameters directly, we assume symmetry across countries and use the model to choose values for
these parameters in order to match relevant moments from the data. More precisely, we assume
that cL/cD and ε are symmetric across countries; that the relative sizes of loans, retail deposits,
and wholesale deposits are the same across countries: A/A∗ = B/B∗ = Bw/B
∗
w; and that fixed
costs imply the same distribution of banks by type in each country. Symmetry assumptions also
imply a link between the relative sizes of the loan markets in each country and the subsidiary’s
equity share, so that we are left with seven parameters to be calibrated (cL/cD, ε, A
∗, B∗, B∗w, FS ,
and FB), for which we choose the following set of target moments:
1. The relative size of the average subsidiary/ average branch, in terms of loans;
2. The relative size of the average subsidiary/ average branch, in terms of deposits;
3. The relative presence of foreign branches versus foreign subsidiaries;
4. The share of US loans extended by subsidiaries or branches of foreign banking organizations;
5. The average interest rate on retail deposits;
6. The average interest rate on loans;
7. The average interbank market rate.
The average foreign subsidiary in our data has loans equal to 3.87 times the loans of the average
foreign branch, and deposits equal to 1.81 times the deposits of the average foreign branch. In our
merged dataset, subsidiaries account for about one-third of US-based FBOs, and in turn FBOs
account for about 30 percent of the total loans extended in the United States. As a target for the
average interest rate paid on retail deposits, we use a 0.12 percent rate paid on checking accounts.
We use LIBOR to pin down the value of the interbank market interest rate, 0.92 percent. Finally,
in the model, loans encompass a variety of products, including mortgages, home equity, consumer,
and commercial and industrial loans. We take an average for these rates in the data and set our
target average interest rates on loans to 6.28 percent.
Table 5 reports the model-generated moments alongside the corresponding moments in the data.
The model does a good job at replicating the relative presence of foreign branches versus subsidiaries
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Table 5: Moments: Model versus Data
Parameters are matched to moments for the year 2010.
Moment Data Model
Nr. of Subsidiaries/Nr. of Branches 0.31 0.32
Share of US Loans issued by FBOs 30% 35%
Average Subsidiary Loans/Branch Loans 3.87 2.09
Average Subsidiary Deposits/Branch Deposits 1.81 1.39
Avg. Interest Rate On Deposits 0.12% 0.23%
LIBOR One-Year Interbank Rate 0.92% 0.84%
Avg. Interest Rate on Loans 6.28% 7.2%
and the overall size of the foreign banking sector. We underpredict the relative size of loans and
deposits, possibly due to an imperfect fit of the parametric efficiency and size distributions. The
target interest rates all fit reasonably well. The corresponding calibrated parameters are reported
in Table E.1 in the Appendix. The calibration reveals a sizable elasticity of loan demand, ε = 4.4,
corresponding to an average mark-up of 31 percent. The reported fixed costs imply that the cost
of opening a subsidiary (branch) is equal to 52.3 percent (82.3 percent) of the average per-period
profits of the subsidiary (branch) itself.
Despite its conceptual simplicity, the model is difficult to compute because of the occasionally
binding constraints and the consequent presence of corner solutions. As such, it is hard to talk
precisely about identification. This said, numerical simulations of the model suggest that the
relative number of subsidiaries versus branches and the share of loans issued by FBOs are very
sensitive to the calibration of the fixed costs. Moments related to an FBO’s relative size are
important for quantifying the cost and market size parameters.
4.2 Global Banks’ Organization and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis
In this section, we use the calibrated model to perform a numerical exercise with the goal of
illustrating the consequences of the European sovereign debt crisis for the global banking sector
under different policy scenarios.
Starting from the baseline model economy, we simulate the European sovereign debt crisis in
two different ways. In the first specification, we introduce an unexpected drop in the probability
of loan repayment (to p′ = 0.964), after banks had decided on their optimal amounts of loans
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and deposits based on the baseline value of p. This exercise, which we refer to as a “3.6 percent
default,” generates an average 10 percent reduction in equity accumulation, similar in size to what
we see in the data (see Figure C.5 in the Appendix). In the second specification, we impose a
homogeneous 10 percent drop in equity at the end of the first period, with the same average effect,
but balanced across all banks. In both exercises, the decline in bank equity reduces banks’ buffers
on capital requirements: E(a)/RWA decreases. This decline differs across banks according to the
concentration of loans in their portfolio allocations.
Table 6 displays the results of this exercise expressed in percentage changes from the baseline
pre-crisis economy, reporting both partial equilibrium (keeping the interbank rate rM constant) and
industry equilibrium effects (letting rM adjust). The two exercises display similar qualitative effects.
The drop in parent equity implies that wholesale deposit supply in US-based branches decreases due
to depositors’ fears about the health of the conglomerate. In our calibrated economy, the decline
in wholesale deposits ranges from 9 percent to 13 percent across the specifications. As branches
experience a funding shock, their demand for borrowing increases, and intrafirm borrowing from
their parents (T > 0) increases from 8 percent to 13 percent across specifications. As we observe
in the data, the need for extra funding is not entirely fulfilled by the intrafirm transfer, and loans
decline moderately between 1 percent and 3 percent in the model, less than what we observe in the
data. At the same time, consistent with our empirical observations, the balance sheet of US-based
subsidiaries is unaffected by the shock that occurs in Europe, despite the large drop in parents’
equity.22 Finally, the shock has a sizable negative effect on aggregate loans in the United States,
which experience a decline of 4 percent.
This simple exercise is consistent with the changes in the balance sheets of branches and sub-
sidiaries that we documented in Section 2, and hence raises our confidence in using the model
to evaluate changes in regulatory policies. To this end, Table 7 illustrates the effects of a loan
repayment shock under several interesting counterfactual scenarios. All the results are reported as
percentage changes relative to the pre-crisis scenario, in industry equilibrium.
The first column in Table 7 is the same as in Table 6, where the shock hits the baseline calibrated
economy. In the second column, we compute the response to the shock in the counterfactual scenario
in which only subsidiarization is allowed. As expected, since subsidiaries in the model are isolated
from the shock in Europe, lending in the United States does not decline in this scenario, while the
22The only changes in subsidiaries’ loans and deposits are due to industry equilibrium responses to changes in the
interbank rate.
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Table 6: Response to a Loan Repayment Shock in the Model
Percentage changes relative to baseline pre-crisis economy.
3.6% default E′(a) = 0.9× E(a)
PE IE PE IE
Average P-B Parent Equity 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.90
Average Branch Wholesale Deposits 0.91 0.88 0.88 0.87
Average P-B Transfers 1.08 1.13 1.09 1.11
Average Branch Loans 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.98
Average P-S Parent Equity 0.81 0.81 0.90 0.90
Average Subsidiary Retail Deposits 1 0.99 1 1.00
Average Subsidiary Loans 1 1.01 1 1.01
Aggregate Loans 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Interbank Rate 0.84% 0.80% 0.84% 0.82%
Table 7: Response to a Loan Repayment Shock in the Model Under Different Policy
Scenarios
Percentage changes relative to baseline pre-crisis economy.
Baseline Only Subs Only Branch k=6% Monetary Policy
(3.6% default) intervention
Average P-B Parent Equity 0.92 – 0.89 – 0.92
Average Branch Wholesale Deposits 0.88 – 0.88 – 0.79
Average P-B Transfers 1.13 – 1.03 – 1.39
Average Branch Loans 0.99 – 0.96 – 1.04
Average P-S Parent Equity 0.81 0.84 – 0.84 0.81
Average Subsidiary Retail Deposits 0.99 0.97 – 0.99 0.94
Average Subsidiary Loans 1.01 1.03 – 1.01 1.08
Aggregate Loans 0.96 1.02 0.94 0.99 1.02
Interbank Rate Change –0.04% –0.08% –0.02% –0.02% –0.18%
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decline in deposits is due to industry equilibrium effects acting through interest rate changes. The
“subsidiaries only” economy is associated with aggregate loans that are 6 percent higher than in
the baseline case: since subsidiaries’ activities are independent from their parents, subsidiarization
prevents the transmission of the European shock to the US economy. The third column shows the
results of the opposite scenario, in which only branching is allowed. This is the scenario that has
the most dramatic implications for the US banking sector: the shock generates a 12 percent decline
in branch deposits, a 4 percent decline in branch lending, and a 6 percent decline in aggregate
loans. This is a substantially larger effect when compared to the baseline case. This result is not
surprising since branching is the organizational form that most facilitates the transmission of shocks
across countries. In the fourth column, we report the effects of the shock under a counterfactual
higher capital requirement: k = 0.06. In the calibrated economy, this has the effect of reducing
the incentives for branching, so all global banks open subsidiaries and the results are very similar
to the ones in the subsidiaries-only case. Finally, in the last column, we illustrate the effects of
the shock under an ad hoc monetary policy intervention: after the equity decline induced by the
default, the Government makes a “helicopter drop” equal to 40 percent of the aggregate M+. As
a result of this intervention, the interbank rate decreases substantially, the transfers from parents
to branches increases, and lending in the United States does not decline, contrary to the result in
the baseline scenario.
4.3 The International Transmission of Shocks: Intensive versus Extensive Mar-
gin Adjustments
While the analysis so far has focused on the European sovereign debt crisis, the structural model
we developed in this paper allows us to think more broadly about how banks respond to episodes
of crisis and the aggregate consequences for the international transmission of shocks. Figure 5
illustrates the implications of a generic and sizable shock to the parent banks’ equity or revenues
for the equilibrium selection in the model. The figure’s left panel shows the equilibrium before the
shock, with selection by efficiency into global status. The right panel illustrates selection in the
post-shock economy. Following the shock, profits drop across the distribution of banks, but banks
with differing global status show different responses. In particular, the fact that subsidiaries are
separately capitalized limits the ability of parent-subsidiary conglomerates to reallocate resources
internally, so the global profits of these banks are the most affected by the shock. On the other
hand, the internal capital market that allows parents and branches to easily reallocate resources
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Figure 5: Equilibrium Profits Before and After a “Large” Shock to Parent Equity
Source: Authors’ calculations.
within the conglomerate across countries implies that their global profits decline less than those of
the parent-subsidiary pairs.
Figure 5 implies that—for large enough shocks—it is more likely that a parent decides to shut
down a subsidiary rather than a branch. Figure 6 shows suggestive evidence of this mechanism
in the data. We superimpose the time series of parent equity-over-assets growth on a histogram
reporting the exit rates of US-based branches and subsidiaries of European banks. It is clear
from the figure that a) compared to branches, subsidiaries are unconditionally more likely to exit
(consistent with the presence of frictions to asset repatriation), and b) periods of more pronounced
exits tend to be periods when a parent’s equity position declines.
Figure 6 provides external validity to the mechanism put forward in this paper. We can use
these insights to evaluate the pros and cons of how the two different organizational forms may act
as vehicles for shock transmission across countries. On the one hand, the counterfactual analysis
of our model economy, based on intensive margin changes, shows that branches transmit shocks
across countries through their internal capital market. However, the same internal capital market
allows for international intrabank reallocations that may minimize the global consequences of a
negative shock. On the other hand, subsidiaries are isolated from shocks to their parents in terms
of their balance sheet adjustments on the intensive margin, but the presence of frictions to the
internal capital market among the different units of the corporation makes global banks that own
subsidiaries less resilient to the shock.
These different responses on the intensive and extensive margins make the task of regulating
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Figure 6: Exit and Equity Dynamics in the Data
Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence and Call Reports.
global banks extremely difficult. Our analysis reveals that regulations have to balance a trade-
off between important policy priorities: limiting the transmission of shocks across countries and
promoting the stability of large, globally important banks.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied how different organizational forms of global banking—branching and
subsidiarization—shape the transmission of shocks across countries. Our analysis focused on banks’
endogenous choice to serve foreign markets via branching or subsidiarization.
We started by establishing a series of stylized facts about the cross-section of global banks
and their response to the European sovereign debt crisis. Informed by the data, we developed
a micro-founded structural model of foreign entry in the banking sector. The model explicitly
distinguishes foreign banking institutions by their mode of operations, which is endogenous and
responds to differences in cost structure, management efficiency, and banking regulations. This
feature of the model allows us to highlight the economic channels through which banks’ mode of
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operations matters for the extent of the transmission of various shocks across countries.
In order to study the effects of the European sovereign debt crisis through the lens of the
theory, we calibrated the model and used it to perform a series of exercises that shed light on the
implications of the current US regulatory framework for the extent of shock transmission. Our
most important finding clarifies the relationship between global banks’ organizational structure
and shock transmission. We show that subsidiarization isolates a global bank’s balance sheets by
location; hence, subsidiarization minimizes contagion. However, subsidiarization is associated with
a limited internal capital market between parent and affiliate, so that the parent does not have
instruments to dampen the global effect of shocks, resulting in possible reorganizations and exits
from the foreign market. Conversely, branching can take advantage of an internal capital market
within the corporation and by smoothing the shock’s effect across countries, reduces its global
impact.
We see this paper as the starting point of a research agenda whose goal is to use careful
quantitative analysis to inform the banking policy discussion. There are many important aspects
of this problem which go beyond the scope of this paper, and we plan to tackle some of these issues
in future research.
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